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Abstract
One of the most basic tenets of federal judicial law is that a federal
court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case.1 Subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by the U.S. Constitution or
federal statutes.
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FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: INTRODUCTION

One of the most basic tenets of federal judicial law is that a federal
court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear a case.1 Subject
matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by the U.S. Constitution or
federal statutes.2 These sources provide two primary bases of subject matter

1.
See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (holding that “when
a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
complaint in its entirety”).
2.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens
of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.

Id.; see also infra notes 3–6.
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jurisdiction: Federal question jurisdiction 3 and diversity jurisdiction. 4
First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts “have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”5 Alternatively, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
over certain cases, based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332.6
With respect to diversity jurisdiction, some diversity cases originate
in the federal district court, but others are removed by defendants from state to
federal court pursuant to § 1441.7 Regardless of their origin, in order to rely
on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the parties must demonstrate that
they meet the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction found in § 1332,
including the minimum amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.8
Section 1332 provides specific jurisdictional requirements based upon the
identity of the parties and whether a case is filed as a class action.9
Although the diversity jurisdiction requirements appear to be
straightforward—at least as they are presented in the statute—their application
has proved to be more complex over time.10 An abundance of case law has
developed regarding how the requirements for diversity jurisdiction should be
interpreted; this Guide focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
interprets them today.11 Specifically, Part II sets out the statutory foundations
of diversity jurisdiction.12 Part III addresses Eleventh Circuit and Supreme
Court of the United States precedents regarding § 1332’s
amount-in-controversy requirement, while Part IV analyzes the statute’s

3.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
4.
Id. § 1332. Title 28, Section 1367 of United States Code provides that the
federal courts, in some circumstances, may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims
that are part of the same case or controversy as claims over which the courts have primary
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 1367; see also, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005) (“Once the court determines it has original jurisdiction over the
civil action, it can turn to the question whether it has a constitutional and statutory basis for
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims in the action.”).
5.
28 U.S.C. § 1331. For example, federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to federal statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1334—bankruptcy proceedings, 28
U.S.C. § 1335—interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 1337—commerce and antitrust regulations, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338—patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1340—internal revenue and customs
duties, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343—civil rights and elective franchise. Id. §§ 1334, 1335, 1337,
1338, 1340, 1343.
6.
Id. § 1332.
Id.; §§ 1332, 1441(a)–(h).
7.
8.
Id. § 1332(a).
9.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)–(d)(4).
See id. § 1332(a)–(d)(4); infra Parts II–VI.
10.
11.
See infra Parts II–VI.
12.
See infra Parts II.
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requirements for diversity of citizenship. 13 Section 1332’s specific
requirements for diversity jurisdiction in the context of class actions are set
forth in Part V.14 Finally, Part VI presents some specific legal rules that come
up in appellate litigation of diversity issues.15
II.

STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND
GENERAL RULES OF APPLICATION

The starting point for federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction is § 1332.16
In subsection (a), that statute provides the basic requirements for diversity
jurisdiction:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, 17 exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between—
(1) citizens of different [s]tates;
(2) citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,
except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction
under this subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the
same [s]tate;
(3) citizens of different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.18

Subsection (d) sets out specific diversity jurisdiction requirements for
class action lawsuits, which are different from those in other diversity cases.19
More generally, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”), provides the following requirement for pleading jurisdiction in
13.
See infra Parts III–IV.
14.
See infra Parts V.
15.
See infra Parts VI.
16.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
17.
Id. The amount in the amount-in-controversy requirement has increased
numerous times since the nineteenth century, and has been set at more than $75,000 since 1996.
See id. § 1332(a).
18.
Id. § 1332(a)(1)–(4).
19.
See id. § 1332(d).
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cases filed originally in federal court: “A pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim
needs no new jurisdictional support.”20 Applying this rule, when a plaintiff
files suit in federal court based on diversity, he or she must allege facts that
demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.21 If a
plaintiff’s inadequate jurisdictional allegations remain uncured, the district
court is required to dismiss the case without addressing its merits. 22
Dismissal is required because “once a federal court determines that it is
without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.”23
Sometimes a diversity case is in federal court because a defendant has
petitioned for its removal from state court.24 The statutory basis for removal
of a civil action from a state court to a federal court is found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a [s]tate court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.25

The burden is on the defendant to adequately plead diversity in a
removal case. 26 A defendant seeking to remove an action from state to
federal court must file a notice of removal in the district court that “contain[s]
a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of
all process, pleadings, and orders” served upon the defendant in the state court
action. 27 If the defendant fails to demonstrate that the § 1332 diversity
requirements have been met in a removed case, the district court will remand
the case back to the state court.28

20.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (emphasis added).
21.
28 U.S.C. § 1332; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); Travaglio v. Am. Express Co.,
735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2013).
22.
Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268–69; see also Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d
1327, 1331 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001).
23.
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999).
24.
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
25.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (“A civil case filed in state
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought
originally in federal court.”).
26.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
27.
Id.
28.
See id. § 1332; Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.
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Even if the parties do not dispute a court’s subject matter jurisdiction
based upon diversity, federal courts are “obligated to inquire into subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”29 The parties
may not agree to waive subject matter jurisdiction. 30 As a result, the
following legal issues may come up either by way of arguments raised by one
or more of the parties, or because the federal court identifies a potential
problem with diversity jurisdiction.31
III.

DETERMINING THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

In civil actions—aside from class actions—there are two basic
requirements for diversity jurisdiction: (1) the amount in controversy must
be more than $75,000; and (2) the parties must be completely diverse.32 This
first section focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit applies the
amount-in-controversy requirement.33
A.

Burden of Demonstrating that Amount in Controversy Has Been Met

As stated above, the diversity statute requires that “the matter in
controversy exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.”34 The party responsible for bringing the case to the federal courts
bears the burden of demonstrating that the diversity requirements have been
met.35 In a case originating in the federal district court, the plaintiff must
allege in good faith a sum adequate to meet the statutory requirements.36

29.
30.
Cir. 1982).

Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410.
Id.; see also Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th

The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a claim involves the court’s
competency to consider a given type of case, and cannot be waived or otherwise
conferred upon the court by the parties. Otherwise a party could work a wrongful
extension of federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress denied
them.

Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1000 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (holding that “subject-matter
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited
or waived”).
31.
See infra Parts III–IV.
32.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4).
33.
See infra Part III.A–F.
34.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
35.
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411–12 (11th Cir.
1999).
36.
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, L.L.C., 329 F.3d 805, 807
(11th Cir. 2003); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288
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In contrast, in cases removed from state court to federal court, the
defendant bears the burden of proving diversity. 37 The defendant must
“show, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting jurisdiction.”38
Applying this standard in removal cases, the federal court will show deference
to the plaintiff’s damages allegations when pleaded specifically.39 However,
when the plaintiff has not alleged a specific amount of damages, the court will
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard.40
B.
“Legal Certainty” Requirement for Dismissal Based on Failure to
Meet Amount in Controversy Requirement
Federal courts “will not dismiss a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the diversity statute ‘unless it appears to a ‘legal certainty’
that plaintiff’s claim is actually for less than the jurisdictional amount.’”41
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that this standard “give[s] great weight to
plaintiff’s assessment of the value of plaintiff’s case.”42 It is an objective
standard.43
In contrast, the court will not allow defendants seeking to remove
cases from state to federal court to benefit from the legal certainty test.44
Thus, where the plaintiff seeks less than the amount required for diversity
jurisdiction, “only the sum actually demanded is in controversy.”45 In order
to avoid remand in removal cases involving alleged damages below the
statutory amount-in-controversy minimum, the defendant “must prove to a
legal certainty” that the plaintiff’s counsel has either falsely or incompetently
assessed the case. 46 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that one way that a
(1938) (stating that “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith”).
37.
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
38.
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1094 (11th Cir. 1994); see also
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
39.
See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 (stating that “plaintiff’s claim, when it is
specific and in a pleading signed by a lawyer, deserves deference and a presumption of truth”).
40.
See Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 947–48 (11th Cir.
2000).
41.
Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863 (11th Cir.
1998) (quoting Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094) (emphasis added); see also St. Paul Mercury Indem.
Co., 303 U.S. at 289 (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”).
42.
Burns, 31 F.3d at 1094.
43.
Id. at 1096.
44.
See id. at 1094–95 (noting that the plaintiff “is the master of his own
claim.”).
45.
See id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
46.
Id.
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removing defendant could remain in federal court in this circumstance was if
“he showed that, if plaintiff prevails on liability, an award below the
jurisdictional amount would be outside the range of permissible awards.”47
C.

Timing of Amount in Controversy Determination for Removal Cases

Jurisdictional facts—including those regarding the amount in
controversy—must be determined as of the date of removal.48 However, the
court is not limited to jurisdictional allegations in the removal petition; it may
also consider post-removal evidence of the amount in controversy, such as that
presented in affidavits, if that evidence is relevant to the time of removal.49
D.

Calculating Amount in Controversy

1.

Law Regarding Aggregating Claims to Meet Amount in Controversy
Requirements

The law regarding aggregation of claims to meet amount in
controversy requirements is complex and not always consistent. 50 This
subsection sets out some of the rules regarding aggregation of claims.51
a.

Aggregation of Multiple Claims by Plaintiff(s) Against a Single
Defendant

As a general rule, a plaintiff may aggregate multiple claims against a
single defendant in order to meet the amount in controversy requirements for
diversity jurisdiction.52 In contrast, the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that multiple plaintiffs’ claims can be aggregated, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, only when “plaintiffs [have] unite[d] to enforce a single
title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.”53 Thus,
47.
Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096.
48.
Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000).
49.
Id.; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.
2001) (stating that “a district court may properly consider post-removal evidence in determining
whether the jurisdictional amount was satisfied at the time of removal”).
50.
14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3704 (4th ed. 2011).
51.
See infra Part III.D(1)(a–c).
52.
Pearson v. Nat’l Soc’y of Pub. Accountants, 200 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir.
1953).
53.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); see also Zahn v. Int’l Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1973).
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when multiple plaintiffs have separate and distinct claims, the court will not
aggregate those claims to meet the minimum amount in controversy.54
b.

Aggregating Claims Against Multiple Defendants

When a plaintiff brings separate and distinct claims against multiple
defendants, the general rule is that claims cannot be aggregated to meet the
amount in controversy requirement. 55 The outcome is different when a
plaintiff brings claims against two or more defendants who are jointly liable to
the plaintiff; in that situation, the claims may be aggregated.56 Applying this
rule, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not aggregate claims against
two insurance companies when one company had primary liability and the
other one had excess coverage of the same insured risk.57
c.

Aggregation in the Context of Class Actions

There are additional specific aggregation rules in the context of class
actions.58 For a complete discussion of those rules, see Part V.59
2.

Methods of Determining Amount in Controversy in Removal Cases

The Eleventh Circuit has set out a specific approach to determining
amount in controversy in removal cases.60 When the state court complaint
seeks more than $75,000 in damages, “a removing defendant may rely on the
plaintiff’s valuation of the case to establish the amount in controversy unless it
appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount
claimed.”61 However, if the complaint does not contain a claim for a specific
amount of damages, the federal court should consider whether “it is facially

54.
E.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Dyess Furniture Co., 292 F.2d 232, 233 (5th
Cir. 1961) (“The law has been . . . long settled . . . that when two or more plaintiffs, having
separate and distinct demands, unite in a single suit for convenience of litigation, their claims
cannot be aggregated to make up the jurisdictional amount.”).
55.
Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961); see
also Cornell v. Mabe, 206 F.2d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1953).
56.
Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13; Cornell, 206 F.2d at 516–17 (“However, when the
action is to recover a single tract of land and the several defendants claim under a common
source of title, the matter in controversy is the entire tract of land and not its several parts.”).
57.
Jewell, 290 F.2d at 13.
58.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012).
59.
See infra Part V.
60.
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
61.
Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1315
(11th Cir. 2002).
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apparent from the complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional requirement.”62
In evaluating whether the amount in controversy is facially apparent
from the complaint, “the district court is not bound by the plaintiff’s
representations regarding its claim, nor must it assume that the plaintiff is in
the best position to evaluate the amount of damages sought.”63 Indeed, the
court may decide that the defendant’s evidence regarding the amount in
controversy is more reliable than that of the plaintiff.64 The district court
“may use [its] judicial experience and common sense in determining whether
the case stated in a complaint meets federal jurisdictional requirements.”65
“If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the
complaint, the court should look to the notice of removal and may require
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was
removed.” 66 In order to sufficiently allege jurisdiction in the petition for
removal, the defendant must do more than make “[a] conclusory allegation . . .
that the . . . amount is satisfied, without setting forth the underlying facts
supporting such an assertion.”67
3.

Determining Amount in Controversy in Cases Involving Only
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In cases where the plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive
relief, the proper measure of amount in controversy is the value of the object
of the litigation.68 The Eleventh Circuit has determined that this value should

62.
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319; see also Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d
1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010).
63.
Roe, 613 F.3d at 1061.
64.
Id. at 1061.
65.
Id. at 1062.
Thus, when a district court can determine, relying on its judicial
experience and common sense, that a claim satisfies the amount in controversy
requirements, it need not give credence to a plaintiff’s representation that the value of
the claim is indeterminate. Otherwise, a defendant could wrongly be denied the
removal to which it is entitled.

Id at 1064.
66.
Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319.
67.
Id. at 1319–20; see also Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972
(11th Cir. 2002) (“The defendants in this case have failed to carry their burden; all they did was
to fill the notice of removal with the type of unsupported assumptions we have held to be
inadequate.”).
68.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977); see
also Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216,
218 (11th Cir. 1997).
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be determined from the plaintiff’s perspective.69 If the value of the requested
relief is too speculative or immeasurable, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the
plaintiff fails to meet the amount in controversy requirements for diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.70
4.

Determining Amount in Controversy for Specific Performance Cases

In diversity cases in which the plaintiff seeks specific performance of
a contract, federal courts generally base their calculation of the amount in
controversy on the value of the property at issue, not the amount that might be
awarded in damages for breach of contract.71
5.

Challenges to Arbitration Awards and the Amount in Controversy
Requirement

The Federal Arbitration Act does not provide subject matter
jurisdiction for a case to be in federal courts.72 Instead, a party seeking to
challenge an arbitration award must demonstrate an independent basis for
jurisdiction, such as diversity.73 In Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc.,74 the Eleventh Circuit held that “a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction where a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award is also
seeking a new arbitration hearing at which he will demand a sum which
exceeds the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction purposes.”75

69.
Ericcson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218–20; see also Davis v.
Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 796 (11th Cir. 1999). Note: Not all circuits
follow the plaintiff’s-viewpoint rule, although the majority have. Ericsson GE Mobile
Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d at 218 n.8.
70.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc., 120 F.3d
at 222 (“Because [the plaintiff] cannot reduce the speculative benefit resulting from a rebid to a
monetary standard, . . . there is no pecuniary amount in controversy.”); see also Morrison v.
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “a plaintiff who bases
diversity jurisdiction on the value of injunctive relief must show that the benefit to be obtained
from the injunction is sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy the . . . amount in
controversy requirement”) (quotation omitted).
71.
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Bullard, 995 F.2d 1046, 1047 (11th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam). “When the value of property sought to be obtained by specific performance
exceeds the sum which might have been awarded in damages, the amount in controversy is
established by the value of the property.” Id.
72.
Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 431 F.3d 1320,
1325 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
73.
See Peebles, 431 F.3d at 1325.
74.
431 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2005).
75.
Id. at 1325.
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Effect of Subsequent Events

Subsequent events do not change a federal court’s analysis of the
amount in controversy, as the court’s jurisdiction is determined as of the date
that the case enters the district court.76 As the Supreme Court of the United
States noted in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,77 the fact that
the plaintiff does not ultimately recover the full amount alleged in the
complaint does not void the federal court’s jurisdiction in a diversity case.78
In explaining the good-faith requirement, the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he
inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court
jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.”79
Applying this rule, a plaintiff’s stipulation or amendment of the
pleadings after a case is removed to federal court that reduces the amount in
controversy below the statutory minimum does not divest the federal court of
diversity jurisdiction.80 Moreover,
the fact that it appears from the face of the complaint that the
defendant has a valid defense, if asserted, to all or a portion of the
claim, or the circumstance that the rulings of the district court after
removal reduce the amount recoverable below the jurisdictional
requirement, will not justify remand.81

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held that, in determining the amount in
controversy, it will not consider whether some damages may be precluded by
the statute of limitations.82

76.

St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289–90, 293

(1938).
77.
303 U.S. 283 (1938).
78.
Id. at 289.
79.
Id.; see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan,
777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that, once the amount in controversy requirement
is met “and the federal court is seized of jurisdiction, the court’s power is not conditional on a
later award of at least that amount”).
80.
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292.
81.
Id.
82.
McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006).
The district court also found it significant that Maytag’s calculation of the
amount in controversy did not account for the effect of any applicable statutes of
limitations. When determining the amount in controversy for jurisdictional
purposes, however, courts cannot look past the complaint to the merits of a defense
that has not yet been established.

Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1332 n.9.
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Relevance of State Law to Determination of Amount in Controversy

Although the question of whether the plaintiff has met the amount in
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is a federal question, courts
will often consider whether state law is relevant to that determination. 83
Specifically, the court will utilize state law “insofar as it defines the nature and
extent of the right plaintiff seeks to enforce.”84
In Broughton v. Florida International Underwriters, Inc., 85 the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether a plaintiff could rely upon claims for
statutory penalties and attorney’s fees, brought pursuant to a Georgia statute,
to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction. 86 Although the court was willing to consider these types of
claims, it ultimately determined that the defendant was not liable under the
state statute and, therefore, the plaintiff did not meet the minimum
amount-in-controversy requirement. 87
In Ericsson GE Mobile
Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc.,88 the
court also considered the availability of state-law remedies—this time under
Alabama law—in determining whether the amount in controversy
requirement was met.89
IV.

DETERMINING DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP

The following Part addresses in more detail the Eleventh Circuit’s
analysis of § 1332’s requirement that parties seeking the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction demonstrate diversity of citizenship.90 In fact, most of
the court’s analysis regarding jurisdiction under this statute has focused
primarily on this specific requirement, as explained further.91
83.
See Broughton v. Fla. Int’l Underwriters, Inc., 139 F.3d 861, 863
(11th Cir. 1998); Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352–53 (1961).
[D]etermination of the value of the matter in controversy for purposes of federal
jurisdiction is a federal question to be decided under federal standards, although the
federal courts must, of course, look to state law to determine the nature and extent of
the right to be enforced in a diversity case.

Horton, 367 U.S. at 352–53.
84.
Broughton, 139 F.3d at 863 (quoting Duderwicz v. Sweetwater Sav. Ass’n,
595 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979)).
85.
139 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 1998).
86.
Id. at 863–64.
87.
Id. at 864.
88.
120 F.3d 216 (11th Cir. 1997).
89.
Id. at 220–21 (holding that under Alabama law, if the plaintiff was
successful it would only be entitled to rebid the contract and that the value of that benefit was
too speculative to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.).
90.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
91.
See infra Part IV.A.
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Rules Related to Pleading Diversity of Citizenship Exists
1.

The Rule for Cases Filed Originally in District Court
a.

Requirements Under FRCP 8

When a party seeks to bring an original civil action in the federal
court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), FRCP 8 applies.92 Under FRCP 8, the
plaintiff’s complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the court’s
jurisdiction. 93 Applying FRCP 8 in the context of § 1332, in order to
adequately allege diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must provide specific
allegations regarding the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship.94
Although the rule is straightforward, numerous legal issues can complicate the
federal court’s analysis of the parties’ citizenship, as illustrated below.95
b.

Timing: Diversity Jurisdiction Is Determined as of Date that the
Action Was Filed

In determining whether the district court has subject matter
jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit looks to the facts as they existed at the time
the action was filed.96
i.

Post-filing Changes in Citizenship Do Not Matter for
Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction

It is well established that the only citizenship that matters for purposes
of determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists is the original parties’
citizenship at the time the lawsuit is filed; any changes in a party’s citizenship
that occur after filing are irrelevant.97 Thus, the district court will not “lose
jurisdiction over a diversity [claim that] was well founded at the outset even
[if] one of the parties . . . later change[s] [its] domicile.” 98 Moreover,
post-filing changes in the citizenship of a party cannot cure jurisdictional
defects in a diversity action, where “[t]he purported cure arose not from a
92.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
93.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
94.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
95.
See infra Part IV.A.1.b.
96.
See Freeport-McMoRan Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)
(per curiam); Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989).
97.
Freeport-McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 428; Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Kan., 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922) (“Jurisdiction once acquired on that ground
is not divested by a subsequent change in the citizenship of the parties.”).
98.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (1970),
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change in parties to the action, but from a change in the citizenship of a
continuing party.”99
ii.

The Substitution of Parties Under FRCP 25(c) Does Not
Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction

Diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse
party to the action—accomplished by substituting the nondiverse party as a
plaintiff under FRCP 25(c)—when the plaintiffs and defendant were diverse at
the time that the action arose and at the time that federal proceedings were
commenced; the substituted party “was not an indispensable party at the time
the complaint was filed”; and the substituted party “had no interest whatsoever
in the outcome of the litigation until sometime after [the] suit was
commenced.”100
iii.

Permissive Intervention of a Party Under FRCP 24 Does Not
Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction

FRCP 24 provides for intervention of right and permissive
intervention by other parties.101 The intervention of a party, by leave of court,
does not destroy the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction when the intervening
party’s “presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the
original parties.”102
Recent Eleventh Circuit case law suggests that an intervenor’s
citizenship does have an effect on a court’s diversity jurisdiction analysis in
some circumstances, however.103 In Flintlock Construction Services, L.L.C.
v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C 104 a case brought pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction, the intervenor was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff and
sought to bring claims against both the plaintiff and the defendants.105 In
order to maintain diversity jurisdiction, the court dismissed the intervenor’s
99.
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2004).
100.
Freeport McMoRan Inc., 498 U.S. at 426–29 (noting that “[a] contrary rule
could well have the effect of deterring normal business transactions during the pendency of
what might be lengthy litigation”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S.
112, 118–19 (1894) (holding that the substitution of nondiverse defendants for diverse
defendants did not destroy federal jurisdiction).
101.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b). FRCP 24(a) provides for intervention of right,
while FRCP 24(b) applies to permissive interventions. Id.
102.
Wichita R.R. & Light Co., 260 U.S. at 54.
103.
See Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710
F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).
104.
710 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2013).
105.
Id. at 1222-23.
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claims against the plaintiff but allowed the claims against the defendant to
proceed.106
iv.

Plaintiff Cannot Later Amend Complaint to Add Nondiverse
Defendant

Although the Supreme Court has recognized that diversity jurisdiction
is not destroyed by a federal court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over
nonfederal claims involving impleader, cross-claims, or counter-claims, a
court will not have diversity jurisdiction where a plaintiff later amends the
complaint to add a nondiverse party.107
v.

In Evaluating Diversity, the Court Should Realign Parties
According to Their Real Interests

The plaintiff’s alignment of the parties is not determinative for
diversity purposes.108 Thus, a federal district court, in determining whether
there is complete diversity, has a duty to realign parties according to their real
interests.109 For example, in shareholder derivative suits brought in federal
court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, the court will align the corporation as a
defendant whenever the corporate management has adopted a position that is
antagonistic to that of the plaintiff shareholder.110
c.

Curing Defects in Diversity Jurisdiction

Under certain circumstances, it is possible to cure defects in diversity
jurisdiction.111 The following subsection provides some analysis of when
curing is possible and how it may be accomplished.112
i.

Courts May Use FRCP 21 to Drop Nondiverse Dispensable
Parties

“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms,
add or drop a party.”113 Thus, although generally diversity jurisdiction is
106.
Id. at 1225.
107.
See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1978).
108.
Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
109.
Id.; see also City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310,
1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that “federal courts are required to realign the parties in an action
to reflect their interests in the litigation”).
110.
See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 96–98 (1957).
111.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 21; infra Part IV.A.1.C.
112.
See infra Part IV.A.1.C.
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determined at the time of filing, a jurisdictional defect relating to diversity of
citizenship can be cured by the dismissal of a nondiverse dispensable party
who destroyed diversity.114 The Supreme Court of the United States has
warned that federal courts should exercise this power sparingly. 115 In
determining whether to dismiss a nondiverse party, the court “should carefully
consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party will prejudice any of the
parties in the litigation.”116
Dismissal of nondiverse parties is not possible in all circumstances.117
If the nondiverse party is indispensable, the court must dismiss the entire case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.118
ii.

Under Some Circumstances, Parties Can Cure Defective Allegations
of Jurisdiction

Parties may amend defective allegations of jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1653.119 Title 28, Section 1653 of the United States Code provides
that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in
the trial or appellate courts.”120 The statute applies only to allegations of
jurisdiction, however, and not to the underlying jurisdictional facts. 121
Moreover, a defendant’s admissions as to his domicile—as well as record
evidence regarding domicile—are sufficient to cure a plaintiff’s pleading
defect when the complaint only pleaded the defendant’s residency.122
Parties may also cure deficiencies in diversity jurisdiction allegations
by submitting evidence of citizenship during case proceedings. 123 The
113.
FED. R. CIV. P. 21; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490
U.S. 826, 832 (1989) (“[I]t is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to
allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been
rendered.”).
114.
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2004);
see also Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 827, 837–38; Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v.
Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011).
115.
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 837–38.
116.
Id. at 838.
117.
See id. at 837–38.
118.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1343.
119.
28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2012).
120.
Id.; see also Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1226 n.12 (11th Cir.
2013) (allowing parties to submit supplemental materials to demonstrate diversity of citizenship
in case removed from state court).
121.
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 831 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1653
“addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exists, and not defects in
the jurisdictional facts themselves”).
122.
See Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342–43.
123.
See id.
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Supreme Court of the United States has held that a federal court may consider
record evidence in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists. 124
Applying that rule, the appellate court “need not vacate a decision on the
merits if the evidence submitted during the course of the proceedings cures
any jurisdictional pleading deficiency by convincing [the court] of the parties’
citizenship.”125
iii.

Limitations on a Party’s Attempts to Cure Jurisdictional
Allegations

Although it is possible for the plaintiff to cure the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint, a federal court will not accept the parties’
stipulation that diversity jurisdiction exists.126 Furthermore, although a party
may cure insufficient allegations of diversity jurisdiction by amending
pleadings, a party may not cure them solely through self-serving statements in
an unsworn brief.127
2.

Case Removed from State Court to Federal District Court

As explained above, a defendant may also remove a case from state
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, as long as he demonstrates that the federal
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.128 As the Eleventh Circuit
explained in Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,129 “[a] civil case filed in state
court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have
been brought originally in federal court.”130 Similar to the diversity rules for
cases filed originally in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit has developed a
series of legal rules for analysis of the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction in
removal cases, as discussed further.131

124.
See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 382 (1904)
(stating “[t]he whole record . . . may be looked to, for the purpose of curing a defective averment
of citizenship, where jurisdiction in a Federal court is asserted to depend upon diversity of
citizenship”).
125.
Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013).
126.
See id. at 1269–70 (stating “it is fundamental that parties may not stipulate
to federal jurisdiction”).
127.
See id. at 1269 (noting that “we have never held that an unsworn statement
in a brief, alone, can demonstrate a party’s citizenship for purposes of establishing diversity
jurisdiction”).
128.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,
154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
129.
154 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998).
130.
Id. at 1287.
131.
See infra Part V.B.
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Burden to Adequately Plead Diversity Is on the Defendant in a
Removal Case

Although the pleading requirements are somewhat similar in removal
cases to those originating in federal court, the pleading requirements for
removed cases are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), rather than FRCP 8(a)(1).132
As explained further, the defendant, not the plaintiff, bears the burden of
pleading diversity in a case removed from state court.133 As part of that
requirement, the defendant’s notice of removal must include “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal.”134
b.

Specific Statutory Rules for Removal of Diversity Cases

Title 28, Section 1441 of the United States Code contains additional
special rules for diversity cases in the context of removal cases, as described
below.135
i.
Fictitious Names (“Jane Does”) Are Disregarded for
Purposes of Determining Jurisdiction in Removal Cases
Title 28, Section 1441(b)(1) of the United States Code instructs that,
“[i]n determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the
jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . the citizenship of defendants sued under
fictitious names shall be disregarded.”136
ii.

Exception When Defendant Is Citizen of State in Which
Action Was Brought

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), “[a] civil action otherwise removable
solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under [§] 1332(a) . . . may not be
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”137
132.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1).
133.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972
(11th Cir. 2002); supra Part III.A.
134.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
135.
See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
136.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1); see also Walker v. CSX Transp., Inc., 650 F.3d
1392, 1395 n.11 (11th Cir. 2011).
137.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see also Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81,
90 (2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
When a plaintiff files in state court a civil action over which the federal district courts
would have original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the defendant or
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Time For Determining Whether Diversity Exists for Purposes of
Removal

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), “[i]n a case not originally
removable, a defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the
post-commencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements—for
example, by reason of the dismissal of a nondiverse party—may remove the
case to federal court within [thirty] days of receiving such information.”138
The timing of a determination of diversity for purposes of removal is
approached somewhat differently than it is in cases originating in federal
court.139 In cases removed from state to federal court, the district court must
look at the case at the time of removal, rather than the time of filing of the
original complaint, to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.140
Generally, the right of removal is decided by the pleadings, viewed at the time
when removal is filed.141
d.

Curing Faulty Citizenship Allegations in Removal Petitions

Faulty allegations of citizenship in a removal petition may be properly
cured by filing an amended petition for removal in the federal district court.142
Moreover, “a district court’s error in failing to remand a case improperly
removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication if federal jurisdictional
requirements are met at the time final judgment is entered.”143 The Supreme
Court has contrasted situations in which a jurisdictional defect remained
uncured and situations in which there was no jurisdictional defect at the time
that the district court entered judgment.144
defendants may remove the action to federal court . . . provided that no defendant “is
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”

Caterpillar, Inc., 519 U.S. at 68 (citation omitted).
138.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 68–69.
139.
Compare Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.
2002), with Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563 (1883).
140.
Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 n.2 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curium); see also Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002);
Leonard, 279 F.3d at 972 (noting that “the critical time is the date of removal”); Poore v.
Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by
Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir. 2007).
141.
Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 253 F.3d 1302, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir.
2001) (per curiam). But see Gibson, 108 U.S. at 563 (holding that diversity of citizenship,
when the basis of jurisdiction, must exist at the time of the filing of the original action, as well as
at the time of the petition for removal).
142.
See D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 147
(5th Cir. 1979).
143.
Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 64.
144.
Compare id. at 76–77, with Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194
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Despite a federal trial court’s threshold denial of a motion to
remand, if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdictional defect
remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated. . . . In this case,
however, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the
District Court. To wipe out the adjudication post-judgment, and
return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional
requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court
system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted
administration of justice.145

e.

Effect of Subsequent Acts on Diversity Jurisdiction

“[I]f a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity
action at the time of removal, subsequent acts do not divest the court of its
jurisdiction over the action.”146
B.

Types of Parties

Over time, the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh
Circuit have further developed the requirements for how a federal court
determines a party’s citizenship in the context of diversity jurisdiction.147
The rules vary, depending on the type of parties.148 Those rules are analyzed
further below.149

U.S. 377, 382 (1904).
145.
Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 76–77 (citations omitted).
146.
Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1095 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that changes to pleadings made after removal in diversity cases do not deprive the court of
supplemental jurisdiction); Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 218 F.3d 1287,
1290–91 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated by Alvarez v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639 (11th Cir.
2007). But see Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F.3d 858, 862 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that,
after removal, plaintiff destroyed diversity by joining non-diverse defendant, but defect could
be cured by dismissing non-diverse defendant).
147.
See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010); Molinos Valle Del
Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2011); McCormick v. Aderholt,
293 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367
(11th Cir. 1994).
148.
Compare McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257–58, with Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at
80.
149.
See infra Parts IV.B.1–12.
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Individuals
General Rules

The plaintiff is required to allege natural parties’ citizenship, not
residence.150 As the court has observed, “[t]o be a citizen of a [s]tate within
the meaning of [§] 1332, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United
States, and a domiciliary of that [s]tate. For diversity purposes, citizenship
means domicile; mere residence in the [s]tate is not sufficient.” 151
Furthermore, the federal court applies federal law, not state law, to determine
a party’s citizenship under § 1332.152 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
“[t]he word ‘States’ . . . includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.”153
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that a person’s “[c]itizenship is
equivalent to domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.”154 The court
has defined a party’s domicile as “the place of ‘his true, fixed, and permanent
home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of
returning whenever he is absent therefrom.’”155 There is a presumption that a
person is a domiciliary of the State of his birth, unless and until he acquires a
new domicile, regardless of whether his parents were citizens of that State.156
In order to demonstrate a change in domicile, a party must show both: “(1)
physical presence at the new location, [and] (2) an intention to remain there
indefinitely.”157
b.

United States Citizens Living Abroad

“[United States] citizens domiciled abroad are neither ‘citizens of a
State’ under § 1332(a) nor ‘citizens or subjects of a foreign state’ and therefore
are not proper parties to a diversity action in federal court.”158 In determining
150.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342 n.12; Taylor, 30 F.3d
at 1367 (“Citizenship, not residence, is the key fact that must be alleged in the complaint to
establish diversity for a natural person.”).
151.
Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
152.
Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
153.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).
154.
McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam).
155.
Id. at 1257–58 (quoting Mas, 489 F.2d at 1399).
156.
See Gregg v. La. Power & Light Co., 626 F.2d 1315, 1317 (5th Cir. 1980).
157.
McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1258.
158.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
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that a United States citizen domiciled abroad destroyed diversity jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court of the United States applied the following reasoning:
In order to be a citizen of a [s]tate within the meaning of the
diversity statute, a natural person must both be a citizen of the
United States and be domiciled within the [s]tate. The problem in
this case is that Bettison, although a United States citizen, has no
domicile in any [s]tate. He is therefore stateless for purposes of §
1332(a)(3). Subsection 1332(a)(2), which confers jurisdiction in
the [d]istrict [c]ourt when a citizen of a [s]tate sues aliens only, also
could not be satisfied because Bettison is a United States citizen.159

Although Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain160 applied this rule
in the context of a defendant, it also applies to a United States citizen living
abroad who is a plaintiff to a lawsuit: “A United States citizen with no
domicile in any state of this country is stateless and cannot satisfy the
complete diversity requirement when she, or her estate, files an action against
a United States citizen.”161
There is one important exception to this rule.162 “[A] citizen of a
state does not lose her domicile when her employer sends her abroad,” or, in
other words, when the citizen is living abroad “‘in the exercise of some
particular profession.’”163
c.

Dual Citizenship

There is also a special rule for individuals who have dual
citizenship.164 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “an individual who is a
dual citizen of the United States and another nation is only a citizen of the
United States for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”165

159.
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 827–28 (1989)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (case in which one defendant was a United States
citizen living overseas); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(3).
160.
490 U.S. 826 (1989).
161.
King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007); see also
Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828–29; Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“[A] United States citizen who is a permanent resident of a foreign country may not invoke
federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”).
162.
See King, 505 F.3d 1171–72.
163.
Id. at 117–72 (quoting Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400, 423 (1853)).
164.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011).
165.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
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Permanent Resident Aliens

The district court does not have diversity jurisdiction of “an action
between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are
domiciled in the same [s]tate.”166
e.

Other Aliens

For a full discussion of how other aliens are treated for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.167
2.

Corporations

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), “a corporation shall be deemed to
be a citizen of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the [s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of
business.”168 Thus, “the complaint must allege either the corporation’s state
of incorporation or principal place of business.”169 As demonstrated below,
the interpretation of this statute has been more complicated in practice, and as
a result, a number of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court cases provide
further guidance for its application.170
a.

Domestic Corporations–Principal Place of Business
i.

The “Nerve Center” Test

“[T]he phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to the place where
the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation’s activities.” 171 The Supreme Court has observed that “in
practice, [the principal place of business] should . . . be the place where the
corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the
actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’
and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”172
166.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
167.
See infra Part IV.B.12.
168.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
169.
Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
170.
See infra Part B.2.a.
171.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010) (noting that some lower
federal courts have referred to that place as the corporation’s “nerve center”).
172.
Id. at 93.
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By taking this approach in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 173 the Supreme Court
specifically rejected an approach to the “principal place of business”
determination that measured the amount of business conducted within a state
and compared that amount to the amount of business conducted in other
states.174
The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed this issue in a
published case since the Supreme Court decided Hertz Corp.175 However,
prior to Hertz Corp., the Eleventh Circuit applied a “total activities” test to
determine a corporation’s principal place of business.176 In MacGinnitie v.
Hobbs Group, LLC,177 the court described the “total activities” test as follows:
[The “total activities”] test combines the “place of activities” test
and the “nerve center” test used by other circuits. Under the “place
of activities” test, the location of the majority of the corporation’s
sales or production activities is its principal place of business.
Under the “nerve center” test, the location of the corporate offices is
generally the principal place of business.
....
The total activities test requires a somewhat subjective
analysis to choose between the results of the nerve center and place
of activities tests, if they differ. . . . Where a company’s activities
are not concentrated in one place, a district court is entitled “to give
these ‘nerve-center’-related facts greater significance” in
determining principal place of business.178

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hertz Corp., the Eleventh
Circuit’s application of the “total activities” test to determine a corporation’s
“principal place of business,” as the Court did in MacGinnitie and earlier
cases, appears to no longer be good law.179

173.
559 U.S. 77 (2010).
174.
See id. at 93–95.
175.
See id.; cf. Holston Inv., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting that, in Hertz, the Supreme Court “announced a simple
rule wherein a corporation’s principal place of business is determined based on where the
corporation’s ‘nerve center’ is located”).
176.
MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005).
177.
420 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2005).
178.
Id. at 1239 (citations omitted).
179.
Compare Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 80, 93–95, with MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d
at 1239.
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Application

Applying the standard set out in Hertz Corp., the Supreme Court
determined that the mere filing of a Securities and Exchange Commission
form “listing a corporation’s ‘principal executive offices’ would, without
more, be sufficient proof to establish a corporation’s ‘nerve center,’” and thus
its “principal place of business” for diversity jurisdiction purposes.180
The Eleventh Circuit has also refused to apply alter ego theory in the
context of diversity jurisdiction; thus, for diversity purposes, the Florida
incorporation of a subsidiary could not be ignored on the ground that the
subsidiary was the alter ego of its non-Florida citizen parent corporation and
that the parent’s California citizenship should be imputed to the subsidiary.181
b.

Domestic Corporation with Principal Place of Business Outside of
United States

There is a special rule for a domestic corporation whose principal
place of business is outside of the United States.182 In Cabalceta v. Standard
Fruit Co., 183 the Eleventh Circuit held that if “a domestic corporation’s
world-wide principal place of business is not in one of the United States, the
District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico, . . . then the foreign principal place of
business cannot be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes.” 184
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) was amended effective January 2012.185
That provision now states: “[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen
of every [s]tate and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the
[s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.”186 It is
unclear whether Eleventh Circuit’s holding from Cabalceta is still good law
after that amendment.187

180.
181.
182.

Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 97.
Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 1985).
E.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.

1989).
183.
883 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1989).
184.
Id. at 1561.
185.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
186.
Id. (emphasis added). That statutory provision states a different rule for
cases in which the defendant is a liability insurer. See id.
187.
See id.; Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1561.
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Foreign Corporations

For jurisdictional purposes, federal courts treat the corporation of a
foreign state as a citizen of that state.188 However, if a foreign corporation
has its principal place of business in the United States, it is a citizen of the state
in which its principal place of business is located.189 However, a corporation
“owned by a foreign state is . . . deemed a foreign state for purposes of federal
jurisdiction.”190 In that case, diversity jurisdiction will not exist unless the
foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(4).191
For additional discussion of alienage jurisdiction, see Part IV.B.12.192
d.

Corporations Chartered Pursuant to Federal Law

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1348, “[a]ll national banking associations
shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed
citizens of the [s]tates in which they are respectively located.”193 However,
the statute does not further define how the court should determine a national
bank’s location.194 The Supreme Court has subsequently provided further
guidance, holding in Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt195 that “a national bank, for §
1348 purposes, is a citizen of the [s]tate in which its main office, as set forth in
its articles of association, is located.”196
Prior to Wachovia Bank, the Eleventh Circuit had stated that a federal
savings bank, as a corporation chartered pursuant to federal law, “would not
be a citizen of any state for diversity purposes and diversity jurisdiction would
not exist unless the corporation’s activities were sufficiently localized in one

188.
See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536
U.S. 88, 91 (2002).
189.
Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 907, 909 (11th Cir.
1984) (“[A] foreign corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it has its principal
place of business.”); see also Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1981)
(determining that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), a Panamanian corporation was a citizen of
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because its principal place of business was located
in Florida).
190.
See Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir.
1993).
191.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542.
192.
See infra Part IV.B.12.
193.
28 U.S.C. § 1348.
194.
See id.
195.
546 U.S. 303 (2006), rev’d, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (2013).
196.
Id. at 307.
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state.” 197 However, after Wachovia Bank, the Court’s analysis in Loyola
Federal Savings Bank v. Fickling198 should no longer be good law.199
e.

Dissolved or Inactive Corporations

Circuit courts that have considered the issue are divided regarding
whether a dissolved or inactive corporation has a principal place of
business. 200 In Holston Investments, Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 201 the
Eleventh Circuit adopted a bright-line rule for this issue: “[A] dissolved
corporation has no principal place of business.” 202 Thus, a dissolved
corporation is only a citizen of its state of incorporation.203
3.

Unincorporated Associations

Unincorporated associations are treated differently than corporations
when it comes to citizenships analysis.204
[U]nincorporated associations do not themselves have any
citizenship, but instead must prove the citizenship of each of their
members to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Furthermore, no matter the particular features of an
unincorporated entity, it has long been “[t]he tradition of the
common law . . . to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups
and to assimilate all others to partnerships,” which must plead the
citizenship of each member.205

Thus, an unincorporated association has no legal existence separate
from its individual members, even if state law permits the unincorporated
association to “sue or be sued in the association[’s] name.”206
197.
198.
199.

Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank v. Fickling, 58 F.3d 603, 606 (11th Cir. 1995).
58 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1995).
See Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 317–19; Loyola Fed. Sav. Bank, 58 F.3d

at 606.
200.
See Holston Invs., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070–71
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing the various approaches to this issue used by other
circuits).
201.
677 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
202.
Id. at 1071.
203.
See id.
204.
See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1081,
1086 (11th Cir. 2010).
205.
Id. at 1086 (alteration in original) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)).
206.
Id. at 1091 (quoting Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir.
1962)).
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Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)

With this standard in mind, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “a
limited liability company . . . ‘is a citizen of any state of which a member of
the company is a citizen.’ . . . ‘To sufficiently allege the citizenships of these
unincorporated business entities, a party must list the citizenships of all the
members of the limited liability company.’”207 Applying this rule, it is not
enough for the complaint to allege that an “[LLC was] created under the laws
of the [s]tate of Georgia, with its principal place of business . . . in Scottsdale,
Georgia.”208
b.

Partnerships: General and Limited

Similar to the approach taken for LLCs, for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, a partnership’s citizenship “depends on the citizenship of each of
its partners.”209 Accordingly, “a limited partnership is a citizen of each state
in which any of its [general or limited] partners . . . are citizens.” 210
Furthermore, when one of the partners is also a partnership, the district court
should inquire into the citizenship of the second partnership’s partners as
well.211
c.

Syndicates

Syndicates—such as the underwriters associated with Lloyd’s of
London—are required to plead every member’s citizenship, just like other
unincorporated associations.212

207.
Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast
SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)); see also Flintlock
Constr. Servs., L.L.C. v. Well-Come Holdings, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013).
208.
Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, LLC, 663 F.3d at 1305; see also
Flintlock Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 1224; Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021,
1022.
209.
Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Sam Broadhead Trust, 588 F.2d 431, 433
n.1 (5th Cir. 1979).
210.
Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021; see also Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990).
211.
Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co., 588 F.2d at 433 n.1.
212.
See Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1088–89
(11th Cir. 2010).
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Unincorporated Joint Stock Companies

Federal courts treat unincorporated joint stock companies as
partnerships for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and apply the same rules for
determining citizenship.213
e.

Unincorporated National Labor Unions

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that federal courts
should not treat unincorporated national labor unions as corporations for
diversity purposes but instead should look to the citizenship of the union’s
members.214
f.

Unincorporated Business Trusts

The Eleventh Circuit has held that the citizenship of an
unincorporated business trust is to be determined on the basis of the
citizenship of its shareholders.215 However, the court has also stated that a
business trust is neither a corporation nor an association, and therefore, where
the trustees hold, manage, and dispose of trust assets for the benefit of trust
beneficiaries, the court should consider the citizenship of trustees rather than
trust beneficiaries.216
g.

The Exception: Sociedad en Comandita

As an exception to the general rule that the citizenship of an
unincorporated association is determined by the citizenship of its individual
members, the Supreme Court has held that a sociedad en comandita—an
entity created under the civil law of Puerto Rico—could be treated as a citizen
of Puerto Rico for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.217 In coming to this
213.
See Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889).
214.
See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145, 147, 149–53 (1965).
215.
See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1337–39 (11th Cir. 2002); Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. B.R.
Starnes Co. of Fla., 827 F.2d 1454, 1457 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“[T]he Trust Funds,
which appear to be voluntary unincorporated associations, are not citizens of any particular
state; rather, the citizenship of trust fund members is determinative of the existence of diversity
of citizenship.”); Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 1987)
(determining that, because trust funds were voluntary unincorporated associations, the
citizenship of their members was determinative of the existence of diversity of citizenship).
216.
See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460, 462, 463 nn. 10, 11,
465–66 (1980).
217.
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933).
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determination, the Court reasoned that the sociedad’s juridical personality “is
so complete in contemplation of the law of Puerto Rico that we see no
adequate reason for holding that the sociedad has a different status for
purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under that
law.”218
4.

Receivers

In an action by or against a receiver, the district court should consider
the citizenship of the receiver for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 219
However, the case law distinguishes between situations in which a receiver is
a proper party to litigation—and thus his citizenship should be
considered—versus those in which he is not a proper party, and his citizenship
should be ignored in diversity determinations.220 In the former, the receiver
is a proper party because another party seeks to take property out of his
possession or seeks relief against his acts.221 However, the receiver is not a
proper party to litigation affecting parties’ rights in property not in his
possession, or to litigation asserting rights to said property in his possession
without disturbing his possession thereof.222
5.

Liability Insurance Companies
a.

Statutory Basis

Section 1332 provides special rules for determining a liability
insurance company’s citizenship for diversity purposes:
[I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of
liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such
insurer shall be deemed a citizen of–
(A) every [s]tate and foreign state of which the insured is a citizen;
(B) every [s]tate and foreign state by which the insurer has been
incorporated; and

218.
219.
220.
(5th Cir. 1921).
221.
222.
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(C) the [s]tate or foreign state where the insurer has its principal
place of business.223

b.

Case Law Interpreting These Provisions

The “direct action” provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) is limited to
actions against insurers and thus is not applicable to a workers’ compensation
action brought in federal court by an insurer.224 Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)
“will defeat diversity jurisdiction only if the claim which the third party has
against the insuredfor intentional tort, negligence, fraud, etc.is the same
one asserted against the insurance company as within the zone of primary
liability for which the company issued the policy.”225 As the Eleventh Circuit
has observed, “courts have uniformly defined the term ‘direct action’ to refer
to ‘those cases in which a party suffering injuries or damage for which another
is legally responsible is entitled to bring suit against the other’s liability
insurer without joining the insured or first obtaining a judgment against
him.’”226
In contrast:
[W]here the suit, brought either by the insured or by an injured third
party, is based not on the primary liability covered by the liability
insurance policy but on the insurer’s failure to settle within policy
limits or in good faith, the [§] 1332(c) direct action proviso does not
preclude diversity jurisdiction.227

In Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,228 the court explained
that, “unless the cause of action against the insurance company is of such a
nature that the liability sought to be imposed could be imposed against the
insured, the action is not a direct action.”229

223.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012).
224.
Id.; Northbrook Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6, 7 (1989); see also
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that § 1332(c)
does not apply to a “declaratory judgment action in which a liability insurer is the plaintiff”).
225.
John Cooper Produce, Inc. v. Paxton Nat’l Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 433, 435 (11th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
226.
Kong v. Allied Prof’l Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Fortson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157, 1159 (11th Cir. 1985))
(emphasis omitted).
227.
Fortson, 751 F.2d at 1159; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
228.
751 F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1985).
229.
Id. at 1159.
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Institutions of Higher Learning

The Eleventh Circuit held that a complaint insufficiently alleged the
citizenship of Tuskegee University when it stated that Tuskegee University
was “‘an Alabama institution of higher learning, located in Macon County,
Alabama.’”230 The court has also applied an Eleventh Amendment immunity
analysis to determine that a state university was not a state citizen for the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction.231
7.

Unincorporated Indian Tribes

There is also a special rule for determining the citizenship of
unincorporated Indian tribes. 232 As the Eleventh Circuit has observed,
“unincorporated Indian tribes cannot sue or be sued in diversity under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because they are not citizens of any state.”233
8.

Estates

“Where an estate is a party, . . . the citizenship that counts for diversity
purposes is that of the decedent.”234 Thus, the legal representative of the
estate is also deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent.235
Note: Prior to May 18, 1989, “federal diversity jurisdiction in estate
cases was determined by looking [into] the domicile of the representative of
the estate,” rather than the decedent’s domicile. 236 On that date, the
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requiring courts to “look to the domicile of
the decedent to determine diversity jurisdiction” went into effect.237 Thus, as
to this issue, case law predating the 1989 amendment is no longer good law.238
230.
Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng’rs, L.L.C. v. Tuskegee Univ., 663
F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
231.
See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir.
1999).
232.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Kraus-Anderson Constr. Co., 607
F.3d 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010).
233.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
234.
Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1327 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
235.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2); see also King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d
1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Where an estate is a party, the citizenship that counts for diversity
purposes is that of the decedent, and she is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which she was
domiciled at the time of her death.”).
236.
Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 668 n.3 (11th Cir.
1991).
237.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
238.
See Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 668 n.3.
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Infants and Incompetents

Section 1332 provides that “the legal representative of an infant or
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same [s]tate as the
infant or incompetent.”239
10.

States

Special diversity jurisdiction rules also apply when a state is a party to
the case.240 A state is not a citizen of a state for the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction.241
A public entity or political subdivision of a state, unless simply an
‘arm or alter ego of the State,’ however, is a citizen of the state for
diversity purposes. Therefore, if a party is deemed to be ‘an arm or
alter ego of the State,’ then diversity jurisdiction must fail.242

When analyzing whether diversity jurisdiction exists over cases
involving state entities as parties, the Eleventh Circuit has applied the
Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis to determine the citizenship of the
state entities.243
11.
a.

State Agencies and State-Created Public Entities

Test for Determining Whether a State Agency Is a Citizen of a State

The Eleventh Circuit has applied the following analysis to determine
whether state agencies are “sufficiently separate and independent from the
state so as to confer citizen status upon them” for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction:
(1) whether the agency can be sued in its own name; (2) whether the
agency can implead and be impleaded in any competent court; (3)
whether the agency can contract in its own name; (4) whether the
agency can acquire, hold title to, and dispose of property in its own
name; and (5) whether the agency can be considered a body

239.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
240.
See Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973).
241.
Id.; Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 412 (11th Cir.
1999); Coastal Petroleum Co. v. U.S.S. Agri-Chems., 695 F.2d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1983).
242.
Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412 (quoting Moor, 411 U.S. at 717).
243.
Id.; Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318.
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corporate having the rights, powers and immunities incident to
corporations.244

As demonstrated below, the Eleventh Circuit takes a case-by-case approach to
this analysis.245
b.

Specific Examples

i.

State Universities

As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Eleventh
Amendment immunity analysis to determine that a state university was not a
state citizen for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.246
ii.

A State Entity’s Board of Trustees

The Supreme Court held—in a case in which the Board of Trustees of
the Ohio State University was a party—that the complaint must allege the
citizenship of each individual trustee because the board was not a corporation,
even though under state law the Board had the power to sue and be sued, enter
into contracts, and supervise lands and other property of the university under
its collective name.247
Taking a different approach, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of
Florida was a citizen of Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because
the title of the land in dispute was vested with the Trustees and “because the
Trustees ha[d] acted . . . as a separate and distinct entity from the state.”248
iii.

Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

In Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
Davis, 249 the Eleventh Circuit determined that diversity jurisdiction was
proper because Florida’s Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
“[was vested] with the power to sue and be sued and possessed other generally
recognized corporate powers.”250
244.
245.
246.
247.

Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1318.
See infra Part IV.B.11.b.
Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412; see supra Part IV.B.6, 10.
See Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 213–18

248.
249.
250.

Coastal Petroleum Co., 695 F.2d at 1316, 1318.
616 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 833.

(1904).
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State Bar

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that the Florida Bar, having been
explicitly created by and existing under the Supreme Court of Florida as an
“official arm of th[at] court,” could not be sued in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction.251
v.

Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans

The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Board of Commissioners of
the Port of New Orleanscreated by state law, granting the Board all of the
rights, powers, and immunities incident to a corporation and specifically
granting to it various business powers, including authority to employ legal
services and engage counselis a separate entity from the State of Louisiana
for diversity purposes.252
vi.

Alabama State Docks Department

The Alabama State Docks Department is merely the alter ego of the
State of Alabama and thus is not a citizen of Alabama for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.253
vii.

Political Subdivisions, such as Municipalities or Counties

“It is well settled that for the purposes of diversity of citizenship,
political subdivisions are citizens of their respective [s]tates.”254 Thus, “a
municipality which is independent in character and function from the state
should be considered a citizen for § 1332 diversity.”255 Moreover, a county
may be a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction if, under state law, it has
a sufficiently independent corporate character.256
251.
252.

See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 414 F.2d 195, 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1969).
C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 424 F.2d 764, 76567 (5th Cir.

1970).
253.
Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 415
F.2d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1969).
254.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97 (1972), cert. granted, 445
U.S. 926 (1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Other cases in which the Supreme Court
determined that political subdivisions were citizens of a state for purposes of diversity include:
Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179, 180 (1933); Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trs., 179 U.S. 472,
485–86 (1900); Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 533–34 (1893); Lincoln Cnty. v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890); Cowles v. Mercer Cnty., 74 U.S. 118, 122 (1869).
255.
Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 n.5 (5th Cir. 1976).
256.
Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719–21 (1973).
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Private Probation Companies as Officers of the Court

The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the argument that private probation
companies, as officers of the court, are governmental entities for purposes of
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). 257 Instead, private
probation companies are private entities, in the same way that attorneys would
not qualify as government entities.258
12.
a.

Specific Diversity Rules for Aliens
Statutory Basis for Alienage Jurisdiction

Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code also sets forth
specific diversity requirements for cases involving foreign citizens.259 First,
the statute provides that federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction of a
civil action that meets the amount in controversy requirement and is between
citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except
that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this
subsection of an action between citizens of a [s]tate and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same
[s]tate.”260

Second, it allows diversity cases to be brought between “citizens of
different [s]tates and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties.”261 Finally, the statute allows diversity cases to be brought
between “a foreign state, defined in [§] 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a [s]tate or of different [s]tates.”262
b.

Case Law Analyzing Alienage Jurisdiction

The Eleventh Circuit has held that aliens who are in the United States
on non-immigrant work visas are not permanent residents for purposes of 28

257.
McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., L.L.C., 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)).
258.
McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242.
259.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)–(4) (2012).
260.
Id. § 1332(a)(2).
261.
Id. § 1332(a)(3).
262.
Id. § 1332(a)(4); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
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U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).263 The court has determined that the permanent resident
alien provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) refers only to an alien’s official
immigration status.264 Thus, an alien who resided in Florida for four years
but had not yet attained official permanent resident status was not a citizen of
Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.265 The fact that an alien resides
in the United States is not relevant for diversity jurisdiction; what matters for
purposes of diversity is the alien’s citizenship, not residency. 266 In
comparison, “an individual who is a dual citizen of the United States and
another nation is only a citizen of the United States for the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).”267
The Supreme Court has held that “the United Kingdom’s retention
and exercise of authority over the [British Virgin Islands (“BVI”)] renders
BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, ‘citizens or subjects’ of the United
Kingdom under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”268
c.

Foreign States

Where a foreign state is a party to a case, diversity jurisdiction may
exist if the foreign state is the plaintiff but will not exist if the foreign state is
the defendant.269 Suits may only be brought against foreign states pursuant to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, rather than 28 U.S.C. §
1332.270
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a foreign state is defined as
including “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.” 271 Furthermore, the statute defines
“instrumentality of a foreign state” as:

263.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340 n.10
(11th Cir. 2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
264.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1340 n.10.
265.
Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1348–50
(11th Cir. 1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
266.
Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1981).
267.
Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1341; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2).
268.
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536
U.S. 88, 100 (2002); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
269.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 n.5 (1989); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1542
& n.11 (11th Cir. 1993).
270.
Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1543; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1330 (1976)).
271.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
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[A]ny entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in [§] 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws
of any third country.272

A corporation owned by a foreign state is deemed a foreign state for
purposes of federal jurisdiction; thus, diversity jurisdiction will not exist
unless the foreign state-owned corporation is the plaintiff, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).273 In order for a foreign state to bring a diversity action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), at least one of the defendants must be a citizen
of a state, and diversity jurisdiction does not exist if all defendants are only
citizens of foreign states.274
C.

Complete Diversity Rule

Title 28, Section 1332 of the United States Code “require[s] complete
diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.”275
D.

Exceptions to Complete Diversity Rule

Although 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity, there are
several exceptions to this rule, as discussed further.276
1.

Court May Ignore Citizenship of a Plaintiff that Has Independent
Basis of Original Federal Jurisdiction Against Defendant

Although the general rule is that diversity jurisdiction requires
complete diversity, there is an exception to this requirement when a

272.
Id. § 1603(b).
273.
Id. § 1332(a)(4); Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1542–43.
274.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4); State Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v.
M/V Wesermunde, 770 F.2d 987, 990–91 (11th Cir. 1985).
275.
28 U.S.C. § 1332; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Wis.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68
(1996).
276.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; infra Part IV.D.1–8.
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non-diverse plaintiff “has an independent basis of original . . . jurisdiction
against the defendant.”277
2.

Court May Properly Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction When
Non-Diverse Defendant Is Sued Under Federal Law

Similarly, the district court still may properly exercise diversity
jurisdiction “when the plaintiff joins a non-diverse defendant sued under
federal law with a diverse defendant sued in diversity.”278
3.

Supplemental/Ancillary Claims Asserted Between Non-Diverse
Defendants
While it is true that a nondiverse defendant must be formally
dismissed from the case to permit a subsequent removal, this in
effect requires only that the plaintiff dismiss all his claims asserted
against the nondiverse defendant and does not prevent the federal
court from exercising ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party claim
against a defendant or a cross-claim between defendants. . . . Once
a court has jurisdiction over a main claim, it also has jurisdiction
over any claim ancillary to the main claim, regardless of the amount
in controversy, citizenship of the parties or existence of a federal
question in the ancillary claim.279

The Supreme Court cases addressing this issue were decided prior to
Congress’s passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
in 1990.280 That statute specifically provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
277.
Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir.
1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
278.
Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line, 877 F.2d 1508, 1511–12 (11th
Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
381 (1959).
279.
Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1252–53 (11th Cir.
1988); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375–77 (1978) (holding
that a diverse defendant could implead a non-diverse third-party defendant, but the plaintiff
could not assert a claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant).
280.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377.
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shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on [§] 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the [FRCP], or over claims by persons proposed
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of [§] 1332.281

The supplemental jurisdiction statute appears to have codified the
Supreme Court’s holdings with respect to these issues, and therefore these
cases should still be good law.282
4.

Nominal Parties

“[A] federal court must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest
jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.”283
Applying this rule, courts will disregard nominal, nondiverse parties in
determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.284
5.

Statutory Interpleader Under 28 U.S.C. § 1335

Claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, applying statutory
interpleader, require only minimal diversity; the plaintiff does not have to be
diverse from the defendants, but at least two defendants must be diverse from
each other.285

281.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)–(b).
282.
Id. § 1367; e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377.
283.
Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980); see also Bacon v.
Rives, 106 U.S. 99, 104 (1882) (holding that the joinder of formal parties, destitute of interest,
cannot oust the federal court of jurisdiction).
284.
See, e.g., Salem Trust Co. v. Mfr.’s Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182, 190 (1924)
(determining depository of a trust was a nominal party when it had no interest in the outcome);
Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 437 (1903) (holding that corporate directors
were nominal parties when the relief prayed for by plaintiffs against both a company and its
directors was to be recovered from the company only); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 469
(1879) (holding that the railroad was a nominal party for removal purposes after it resolved its
dispute with the defendant and had no common interest with the trustee plaintiffs).
285.
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523, 530 (1967); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Class Actions

The statute sets forth requirements of minimal diversity, rather than
total diversity, for class actions brought pursuant to the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction.286
For further discussion of diversity jurisdiction and class actions, see
Part V.287
7.

Total Diversity Rule and Alienage Jurisdiction
a.

Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)

In cases in which jurisdiction is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2), the presence of aliens as both plaintiff and defendant destroys full
diversity under alien jurisdiction.288
b.

Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3)

There is an exception to the previous rule.289 Under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(3), the district court may have diversity jurisdiction over a case in
which there are aliens on both sides of the actions, as long as there are also
citizens of a state on both sides.290
8.

Removal Cases, When Non-Diverse Party Fraudulently Joined

Although the district court generally will not have diversity
jurisdiction over removal cases where the parties are not completely diverse,
district courts still have diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff has

286.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
287.
See infra Part V.
288.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama,
633 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 2011) (vacating judgment in favor of alien corporation against
alien citizens because aliens’ presence destroyed full diversity under alienage jurisdiction);
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “the
presence of at least one alien on both sides of an action destroys diversity”); Ed & Fred, Inc. v.
Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the rule
of complete diversity was applicable to an action brought by an alien against a citizen of a state
and another alien).
289.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).
290.
Id.; Iraola & Cia, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 232 F.3d 854, 860 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“It is a standard rule that federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over cases
where there are foreign entities on both sides of the action, without the presence of citizens of a
state on both sides.”).
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fraudulently joined non-diverse defendants in order to prevent removal.291
The Eleventh Circuit has identified three circumstances when non-diverse
parties have been fraudulently joined in state court. 292 First, fraudulent
joinder exists “when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause
of action against the resident—non-diverse—defendant.” 293 Second, a
plaintiff may fraudulently plead jurisdictional facts in an attempt to avoid
removal.294 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has identified a third example of
fraudulent joinder: “[W]here a diverse defendant is joined with a non-diverse
defendant as to whom there is no joint, several, or alternative liability and
where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to the
claim against the non-diverse defendant.”295
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “‘[t]he determination of whether
a resident defendant has been fraudulently joined must be based upon the
plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal, supplemented by any affidavits
and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.’”296 The district court
should approach a fraudulent joinder claim in the same way that it would a
motion for summary judgment under FRCP 56(b), resolving disputed
questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff.297
With respect to the first type of fraudulent joinder, there is a fairly
high hurdle for a removal attempt. 298 In Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 299 the
Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]f there is even a possibility that a state court
would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the
resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and
remand the case to the state court.”300 Thus, “[t]he plaintiff need not have a
winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a

291.
292.
293.

Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.; see also Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir.

1983).
294.
Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440.
295.
Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287; see also Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77
F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996).
296.
Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001),
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005)).
297.
Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322–23; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b).
298.
See Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440–41.
299.
709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983).
300.
Id. at 1440–41.
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possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be
legitimate.”301
The Eleventh Circuit has addressed the third type of fraudulent
joinder in the context of class action cases. 302 This Guide addresses that
analysis in greater detail in Part V.303
E.
Exceptions Where Court Will Not Exercise Jurisdiction Even if
Diversity Is Established
1.

Probate Exception

Under limited circumstances, courts will abstain from hearing a case
involving wills and estates, even if there is diversity of citizenship, pursuant to
the judicially-created probate exception. 304 However, this exception is
narrowly construed.305
2.

Domestic Relations Exception
a.

General Rule

The domestic relations exception divests the federal courts of power
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees but does not ordinarily
include tort claims. 306 Thus, even if the district court has diversity
jurisdiction, the court will abstain from hearing a claim in cases involving the
301.
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)
(emphasis omitted).
302.
See Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287–90; Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77
F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1996).
303.
See infra Part V.
304.
See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d
666, 672 (11th Cir. 1991).
305.
See Markham, 326 U.S. at 494 (“[F]ederal courts of equity have jurisdiction
to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a
decedent’s estate to establish their claims so long as the federal court does not interfere with the
probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in
the custody of the state court.”); Glickstein, 922 F.2d at 672–73; Mich. Tech. Fund v. Century
Nat’l Bank, 680 F.2d 736, 737–38, 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that district court properly
exercised jurisdiction over action against decedent’s estate seeking a declaration that decedent’s
will conveyed certain assets to plaintiff, in spite of fact that there were pending probate
proceedings and the federal court was required to interpret the will); DeWitt v. Duce, 599 F.2d
676, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding that a suit alleging independent tort claim for
intentional interference with inheritance was properly before district court based on diversity
jurisdiction).
306.
See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).
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parties’ domestic affairs.307 Speaking specifically to this issue, in Ingram v.
Hayes,308 the Eleventh Circuit stated that “federal courts generally dismiss
cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitation[] rights,
establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or
divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.”309
b.

Limitations to the Domestic Relations Exception

“The [domestic relations] exception . . . is to be read narrowly and
does not—at least, ordinarily—include third parties in its scope.” 310 The
Eleventh Circuit has stated that courts should not abstain from cases related to
domestic-relations law “when the following factors are absent: (1) strong
state interest in domestic relations; (2) competency of state courts in settling
family disputes; (3) the possibility of incompatible federal and state decrees in
cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state; and (4) the problem of
congested federal court dockets.”311 Instead, “federal courts should dismiss
the action only if hearing the claim would mandate inquiry into the marital or
parent-child relationship.”312
c.

Examples

In Rash v. Rash,313 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the domestic
relations exception did not apply in a case disputing assets, specifically
alimony, rights to pension, and real property, and which involved the question
of which competing state decrees should be enforced.314 Similarly, in Kirby
v. Mellenger, 315 the court held “that the district court [had] abused its
discretion [in] dismissing [the] case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” in a
diversity case in which a former wife sued her former husband to obtain a

307.
See Rash v. Rash, 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999).
308.
866 F.2d 368 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
309.
Id. at 369–70 (determining that the district court properly dismissed child
support arrearage claim because claim would require district court to decide the propriety of the
Alabama state court’s order).
310.
Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), reh’g
granted, 719 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1998); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704 n.7 (observing that
the third-party defendant in that case “would appear to stand in the same position with respect to
[the plaintiff] as any other opponent in a tort suit brought in federal court pursuant to diversity
jurisdiction”).
311.
Stone, 135 F.3d at 1441; see also Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370.
312.
Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370.
313.
173 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1999).
314.
See id. at 1380.
315.
830 F.2d 176 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
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share of his military retirement benefits not awarded under a Texas divorce
decree.316
The Eleventh Circuit’s precedent also demonstrates that a federal
court may have jurisdiction over some issues but not others in this context.317
Thus, in Jagiella v. Jagiella,318 the Circuit Court determined that the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction over the former wife’s suit seeking
alimony and child support arrears and properly refused to exercise jurisdiction
the of former husband’s counterclaims for modification of the divorce decree
by reducing his child support payments and increasing his visitation rights and
for alienage of his children’s affection.319
3.

Violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1359: Parties Improperly or Collusively
Joined to Invoke Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1359, “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such
court.”320
V.

SPECIAL RULES FOR CLASS ACTIONS AND MASS ACTIONS

Plaintiffs may bring a class action in federal court pursuant to FRCP
23.321 If the class action relies on the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, it
must meet the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.322 Specifically,
§ 1332(d) provides specific rules for determining when a federal court may

316.
See id. at 178–79.
317.
See Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564–65 (5th Cir. 1981).
318.
647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1981).
319.
See id. at 564–65.
320.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012); see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394
U.S. 823, 826–29 (1969) (holding that § 1359 prevents federal courts from exercising diversity
jurisdiction in cases in which parties have been collusively joined, regardless of whether
diversity was based on parties being citizens of different states or alienage jurisdiction);
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1314–16 (11th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the application of § 1359 in the context of transfers or assignments of claims and
holding there is no presumption of collusion in determining whether diversity jurisdiction was
manufactured in violation of the statute); Pacheco De Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1381
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Corp. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 2001),
superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-31.1 (2005), as stated in Hewett v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., 614 S.E.2d 875 (2005) (holding that fraudulent joinder of defendants could not be
used to defeat diversity jurisdiction).
321.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
322.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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exercise diversity jurisdiction in class actions.323 Many of the rules regarding
diversity jurisdiction are different for class actions than for other diversity
cases; and thus, it is important to look closely at the provisions in § 1332(d).324
Furthermore, in many circumstances, case law decided prior to passage of
CAFA,325 which revised the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class
actions, may no longer be good law.326 CAFA sets out specific requirements
for federal diversity jurisdiction in two types of cases: Class actions and
certain mass actions that qualify as class actions. 327 The following
subsections analyze the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in class action
and mass action lawsuits post-CAFA.328
A.

Class Actions versus Mass Actions

As stated above, CAFA applies to class actions and certain mass
actions.329 A class action is defined as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of
the [FRCP] or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.”330 The
statute defines a mass action as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”331 For
the most part, CAFA applies the same diversity jurisdiction rules to mass
actions as class actions, going so far as to define a mass action as a class action
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 332 except for specific circumstances
analyzed in the following subsections.333 The Eleventh Circuit has observed
that, “CAFA’s mass action provisions present an opaque, baroque maze of
interlocking cross-references that defy easy interpretation.”334

323.
See id.
324.
Id.
325.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 4
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2012)).
326.
Id.
327.
See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op.
at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).
328.
See infra Parts A–C.
329.
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2 § 4, 119 Stat. at 9.
330.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2012).
331.
Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
332.
See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (“a mass action shall be deemed to be a class
action removable under [§ 1332(d)(2)-(10)] if it otherwise meets the provisions of those
paragraphs”); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1199–1201 (11th Cir. 2007).
333.
See infra Parts B–C.
334.
Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1198.
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Amount-in-Controversy Requirements

As explained further below, CAFA sets out different
amount-in-controversy requirements depending on whether the lawsuit is a
class action or a mass action.335
1.

Amount-in-Controversy Requirements for Class Actions

Class actions have a different amount-in-controversy requirement
than other cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.336 Under CAFA, a
class action brought pursuant to the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction must
exceed the value of five million dollars excluding costs and interests.337 The
statute explicitly states that each individual member’s claims will be
aggregated to determine the amount in controversy.338 The statute does not
require any individual class action plaintiff to assert a claim exceeding
seventy-five thousand dollars. 339 Although CAFA’s legislative history
suggests Congress’s intent that courts resolve doubts about the amount in
controversy in favor of finding jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected
that approach.340 Instead, the court has held that doubts regarding amount in
controversy should be resolved in favor of remanding the class action to the
state court.341
Applying the same rule that applies in other diversity cases that are
removed to federal court, when the plaintiffs in a class action have not pleaded
a specific amount of damages, the removed defendant is required to prove that
the amount in controversy meets the statutory minimum by a preponderance
of the evidence.342 In those circumstances, the district court looks to the face
335.
Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (6) (setting out
amount-in-controversy requirements for class actions) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)
(setting out specific requirements for mass actions that qualify as class actions under the
statute).
336.
Compare the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) with those set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
337.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
338.
Id. § 1332(d)(6). Prior to CAFA, class action plaintiffs were only allowed
to aggregate their claims in limited circumstances. See, e.g., Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
410 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (11th Cir. 2005).
339.
Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 623 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
340.
See generally Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1327–30 (11th
Cir. 2006) (discussing the legislative history of CAFA).
341.
Id. at 1329–30.
342.
Id. at 1330 (citing Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2001)); see also Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 550 F. App’x 830 (11th Cir. 2013).
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of the complaint, and, “[i]f the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent
from the complaint, the court [looks] to the notice of removal and may require
evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was
removed.”343 A defendant’s conclusory allegation in the notice of removal,
stating that the jurisdictional amount has been met, is insufficient to satisfy
CAFA’s amount in controversy requirement.344 In applying this rule, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant’s bare assertions that the amount in
controversy in one case was similar to that in other cases that the federal court
had jurisdiction over, without specific factual details, affidavits, or other
evidence to support those assertions, was insufficient to establish the court’s
diversity jurisdiction in CAFA cases.345 In contrast, the federal court may
consider a defendant’s own affidavits, declarations, and other evidence in
inferring that the jurisdictional minimum has been met.346
The Eleventh Circuit has also applied the same standard for
determining the amount in controversy when class action plaintiffs seek
injunctive or declarative relief as the court does for other types of diversity
cases.347 Thus, in South Florida Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,348
the court determined that “the value of declaratory relief is ‘the monetary
value of the benefit that would flow to the plaintiff if the [relief he is seeking]
were granted.’” 349 In the case of a class action, the federal court should
therefore “aggregate the claims of individual class members and consider the
monetary [benefit] that would flow to the entire class if declaratory relief were
granted.”350
Furthermore, in class actions in which a class has not yet been
certified, a named plaintiff cannot stipulate that the class will not seek
damages in excess of five million dollars in an attempt to avoid removal to
federal court.351 In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,352 the Supreme
343.
Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Williams, 269 F.3d at 1319); see also
S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014) (“What counts
is the amount in controversy at the time of removal.”). Like other removal cases, the
calculation of the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases is based upon the time of
removal. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 751.
344.
Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752 (citing Williams, 269 F.3d at 1320).
345.
See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1189, 1210–11, 1220–21
(11th Cir. 2007); Pretka, 608 F.3d at 752–54 (discussing the court’s reasoning in Lowery).
346.
Pretka, 608 F.3d at 755.
347.
See S. Fla. Wellness, Inc., 745 F.3d at 1315–16; supra Part 111.D.3.
348.
745 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014).
349.
Id. at 1316 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1268
(11th Cir. 2000)).
350.
Id.
351.
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 19,
2013).
352.
No. 11-1450, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013).
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Court explained that such a stipulation was ineffective “because a plaintiff
who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed
class before the class is certified.”353 The Supreme Court observed that this
rule is different from non-class action diversity cases, where the plaintiff has
the ability to legally bind himself through his stipulations.354
2.

Amount in Controversy Requirements for Mass Actions

Title 28, Section 1332 or the United States Code sets out different
amount-in-controversy requirements for mass actions than for class actions.355
In addition to requiring total aggregated claims of more than five million
dollars, the statute specifies that the federal court only has diversity
jurisdiction over plaintiffs in mass actions whose individual claims satisfy the
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement provided for in 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).356
C.

Diversity Requirements under CAFA
1.

Basic Requirements for Diversity

Under CAFA, complete diversity of citizenship is not required. 357
Instead, the statute only requires minimal diversity for both class actions and
mass actions.358 CAFA’s diversity requirements can be met in the following
three specific circumstances:

353.
Id. at 4.
354.
Id. at 7.
355.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2012) (setting out amount in
controversy requirements for class actions), with § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (stating that the federal
court only has diversity jurisdiction over mass action plaintiffs who meet the amount in
controversy requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
356.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d)(11)(B)(i). The Eleventh Circuit considered this
requirement in Lowery, but did not ultimately determine how the $75,000 amount in
controversy requirement fit within the five million dollar amount in controversy requirement
because the court determined that the defendant did not demonstrate that the removed action
met the five million dollar minimum. See id. § 1332(d)(2); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483
F.3d 1184, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
357.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)–(C).
358.
See id.; Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip
op. at 2 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014). Prior to CAFA’s effective date, the Supreme Court interpreted §
1332(a) to require that each named plaintiff in a class action be diverse from each defendant, but
that standard was replaced by CAFA’s minimal diversity standard. Lowery, 483 F.3d at 1193
n.24 (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921)).
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(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate
different from any defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen
or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a
[s]tate; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a [s]tate and
any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign
state.359

A class action also requires a minimum of one hundred plaintiffs,
including named and unnamed class members.360 In contrast, a mass action
requires a minimum of one hundred named plaintiffs.361 In Mississippi ex rel.
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 362 the Supreme Court of the United States
specifically rejected the argument that the numerosity requirement for mass
action diversity jurisdiction could be met when a state filed suit as a sole
plaintiff based upon injuries suffered by the state’s citizens.363 Moreover, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that a defendant may not attempt to combine two
separate cases under the mass action provision by arguing that the cases
involved common questions of law and fact, when the plaintiffs of those suits
did not seek to consolidate their claims and each case, when considered
separately, did not meet the numerosity requirements for federal diversity
jurisdiction over mass actions.364
2.

Federal Court’s Discretionary Authority to Decline to Exercise
Diversity Jurisdiction Over Some Class Actions

There are certain circumstances when the district court may decline to
exercise diversity jurisdiction in class action cases even when minimal
diversity exists.365 This discretionary authority exists in cases where more
than one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the proposed class members—as
well as the primary defendants—are citizens of the state in which the action
has been filed. 366 The statute directs the district court to consider the
359.
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9
(2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012)).
360.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B); see also id. § 1332 (d)(1)(D).
361.
See AU Optronics Corp., No. 12-1036, slip op. at 5 (interpreting the
requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)).
362.
No. 12-1036, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).
363.
See id. at 1.
364.
See Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2013).
365.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).
366.
Id.
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following factors in determining whether to decline to exercise diversity
jurisdiction in these circumstances:
(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or
interstate interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the
[s]tate in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of
other [s]tates;
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks
to avoid [f]ederal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the [s]tate in which the action
was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate
is substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other
[s]tate, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed
class is dispersed among a substantial number of [s]tates; and
(F) whether, during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, [one] or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims
on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.367

3.

Federal Court Must Decline to Exercise Diversity Jurisdiction over
Class Actions in Certain Circumstances

Title 28 § 1332 of the United States Code also sets out certain
circumstances when the district court must decline to exercise diversity
jurisdiction in class action cases, even when the minimal diversity
requirements in § 1332(d)(2) have been met.368 Specifically, the district court
will not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the following class actions:
(A)(i) . . . a class action in which—
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate are citizens of the [s]tate in which the action
was originally filed;
(II) at least [one] defendant is a defendant—

367.
368.

Id. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F).
See id. § 1332(d)(4).
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(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the
plaintiff class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the [s]tate in which the action was originally
filed; and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any
related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the [s]tate in
which the action was originally filed; and
(ii) during the [three]-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or
similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of
the same or other persons.369

The Eleventh Circuit refers to this provision as the “local
controversy” exception.370
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that CAFA’s legislative history
indicated “Congress intended the local controversy exception to be a narrow
one, with all doubts resolved ‘in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the
case.’”371 The party seeking to keep the class action out of federal court has
the burden of demonstrating that CAFA’s local controversy exception
applies.372 With respect to the first prong, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that
plaintiffs’ designation of particular classes may make it difficult for the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that more than two-thirds of the plaintiff class were
citizens of a particular state, but that difficulty did not excuse them from the
local controversy exception’s requirements.373
The court has also provided some guidance regarding the second
prong, known as the “significant defendant” prong.374 In Evans v. Walter
Industries, Inc., 375 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the non-diverse
defendant was not a significant defendant because: (1) the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that the defendant was significantly liable for the damages
alleged by the plaintiffs, in comparison to seventeen other co-defendants;
369.
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
370.
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 2006).
371.
Id. at 1163 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005)).
372.
Id. at 1164 (stating that “when a party seeks to avail itself of an express
statutory exception to federal jurisdiction granted under CAFA, . . . we hold that the party
seeking remand bears the burden of proof with regard to that exception”).
373.
Id. at 1166.
374.
See id. at 1166–68.
375.
449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006).
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(2) the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the defendant played a significant
role in the underlying actions that caused the plaintiffs’ damages; and (3) the
facts showed that the defendant’s actions were primarily limited to a small part
of the time period and geographical location at issue in the case.376
The district court should also not exercise diversity jurisdiction over
class actions when at least two-thirds of the proposed class members, as well
as the defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action has been filed.377
4.

Statutory Limitations on a Federal Court’s Exercise of Diversity
Jurisdiction in Mass Action Removal Cases

Although district courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over
certain mass actions removed from state court, the statute provides additional
limitations for jurisdiction in that context.378 Specifically, § 1332(d)(11)(B)
specifically bars the federal courts’ exercise of diversity jurisdiction in mass
action removal cases under the following circumstances:
(I) all of the claims in the action arise from an event or occurrence in
the State in which the action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in
injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that State;
(II) the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant;
(III) all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the
general public—and not on behalf of individual claimants or
members of a purported class—pursuant to a [s]tate statute
specifically authorizing such action379; or
(IV) the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for
pretrial proceedings.380

Aside from these requirements, the same rules that apply to class
actions originating in federal court also apply to removal cases.381
376.
Id. at 1167–68 (stating that “plaintiffs’ evidence offers no insight into
whether U.S. Pipe played a significant role in the alleged contamination, as opposed to a lesser
role, or even a minimal role. The evidence does not indicate that a significant number or
percentage of putative class members may have claims against U.S. Pipe, or indeed that any
plaintiff has such a claim.”).
377.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2012).
378.
See id. § 1332(d)(11).
379.
Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B). The Supreme Court has referred to this provision as
the “general public exception.” See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
No.12-1036, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).
380.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)–(IV).
381.
See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A).
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The Defendant Has the Burden of Demonstrating that Diversity
Jurisdiction Exists in Removal Cases.

Although CAFA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended
the plaintiff to bear the burden of demonstrating that diversity jurisdiction
exists in removal cases, the statute is silent as to that issue.382 As a result, the
Eleventh Circuit has held that “CAFA does not change the traditional rule that
the party seeking to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction.”383
6.

Timing of Citizenship Determination in Class Actions

The statute directs the federal court to base citizenship determinations
as of the date on which the complaint is filed.384 If the original complaint did
not meet federal subject matter jurisdictional requirements, the district court
should base citizenship determinations as of the date on which an amended
complaint is filed, if the amended complaint then adequately pleads federal
subject matter jurisdiction.385
7.

Other Special Diversity Rules in Class Action and Mass Action Cases
a.

Only Named Parties Considered for Diversity Purposes

It is a long-standing rule that the federal court ordinarily considers, for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, only the citizenship of the named parties.386
b.

Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations

Unincorporated associations are treated differently in class actions
than they are in other diversity cases.387 “For purposes of [a class action], an
382.
See id. § 1332(d); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42 (2005).
383.
Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006)).
384.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7).
385.
Id.
386.
See Day v. Persels & Assocs., 729 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013);
Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass’n, 624 F.2d 717, 720 (5th Cir. 1980).
[T]he rule that absent class members are not parties for the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction “is . . . justified by the goals of class action litigation” because “[e]ase of
administration of class actions would be compromised by having to consider the
citizenship of all class members” and “considering all class members for these
purposes would destroy diversity in almost all class actions.

Day, 729 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002)).
387.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10).
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unincorporated association [is] deemed to be a citizen of the [s]tate where it
has its principal place of business and the [s]tate under whose laws it is
organized.”388
VI.
A.

APPELLATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR CASES INVOLVING DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION ISSUES
Standard of Review

Because jurisdictional questions are questions of law, appellate courts
review de novo whether the federal court has diversity jurisdiction in a civil
action.389 The court also applies a de novo standard to the review of the
district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1).390 However, the Eleventh Circuit reviews
a district court’s jurisdictional factual findings regarding the parties’
citizenship for clear error.391
B.

Adequacy of Diversity Allegations

When the pleadings were inadequate for the court to assess whether
diversity jurisdiction existed, the Eleventh Circuit has “issued a jurisdictional
question asking the parties whether the allegations of citizenship were
deficient and, if so, whether amendment of the complaint was necessary.”392
After determining that the plaintiff’s “allegations of citizenship were fatally
deficient,” the court remanded the case to the district court for jurisdictional
findings.393

388.
389.

Id.
See Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir.

1998).
390.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (amended 2007); Underwriters at Lloyd’s v.
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2010).
391.
See Travaglio v. Am. Express Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013);
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d at 1085.
392.
Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1267–68; see also Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269
F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that, when the court could not ascertain whether the
amount in controversy in a removal case was sufficient for diversity jurisdiction, it required the
parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue).
393.
See Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1268.
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Requirement that Appellate Court Sua Sponte Consider Whether
Diversity Jurisdiction Exists

If it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is in question, the
appellate court is required to sua sponte inquire into both its own jurisdiction
and that of the district court whose opinion is under review.394
D.

Objections Based on Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Can Be
Raised at Any Time

A party can raise an objection to the federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction at any time.395 Applying this rule, the Supreme Court has held
that, even after a party loses at trial, he or she may still move for dismissal
under FRCP 12(b)(1).396

394.
Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999);
see also Henderson v. Shinseki, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2011) (stating that
“federal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of
their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the
parties either overlook or elect not to press”); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934).
395.
Henderson, No. 09-1036, slip op. at 5.
396.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3) (amended 2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).
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